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Abstract
Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, trust in the financial industry was at an all-time low
as the American taxpayer was forced to bailout the very same institutions responsible for their
suffering. In response, Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010 to ensure another crisis like 2008
never happen again. Section 78u-6 of the Act provides incentives and protections for whistleblow-
ers who report violations of securities laws. In recent years there has been a divide among circuit
courts over the question of whether employees who report violations internally to their bosses—
and not directly to the SEC—are protected by the Act. Currently, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits, have all adopted a different answer to this question. In analyzing this issue, courts have
so far agreed there is only one definition of whistleblowers according to Dodd-Frank: those indi-
viduals who report directly to the Commission. The circuit split, however, is focused on whether,
despite the single definition of “whistleblower” provided for by Dodd-Frank, its anti-retaliation
provision nonetheless protects individuals who report internally and not directly to the SEC. This
Note proposes that under a proper reading of the Act, Congress has granted the SEC broad au-
thority to determine who is a whistleblower and has not narrowly defined a whistleblower to mean
only those who report directly to the Commission.
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ABSTRACT
Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, trust in the financial industry
was at an all-time low as the American taxpayer was forced to bailout the
very same institutions responsible for their suffering. In response,
Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010 to ensure another crisis like 2008
never happen again. Section 78u-6 of the Act provides incentives and
protections for whistleblowers who report violations of securities laws. In
recent years there has been a divide among circuit courts over the question
of whether employees who report violations internally to their bosses—
and not directly to the SEC—are protected by the Act. Currently, the
Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, have all adopted a different answer to
this question. In analyzing this issue, courts have so far agreed there is
only one definition of whistleblowers according to Dodd-Frank: those
individuals who report directly to the Commission. The circuit split,
however, is focused on whether, despite the single definition of
“whistleblower” provided for by Dodd-Frank, its anti-retaliation
provision nonetheless protects individuals who report internally and not
directly to the SEC. This Note proposes that under a proper reading of the
Act, Congress has granted the SEC broad authority to determine who is a
whistleblower and has not narrowly defined a whistleblower to mean only
those who report directly to the Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, corporate whistleblowers have become one of the
many tools in a financial regulator’s arsenal in the fight to protect the
American public from securities fraud. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC or the Commission) announced in August 2016
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that whistleblower award payouts had reached over $100 million.1
Specifically, the Commission has awarded thirty-four whistleblowers
over $111 million dollars for providing information that led to successful
enforcement actions.2 Jane Norberg, Chief of the Office of the
Whistleblower, stated, “the total award amount demonstrates the
invaluable information and assistance whistleblowers have provided to
the agency and underscores the program’s extraordinary impact on the
agency’s enforcement initiatives.”3
In addition to paying out whistleblower awards, the SEC returned
$584 million dollars to investors because of the cooperation of the
whistleblowers; this underscores the “transformative effect the SEC’s
whistleblower program has had on the agency’s enforcement program.”4
Of the whistleblowers who were previously employed by the offending
company, sixty-five percent of whistleblowers initially reported their
complaints internally rather than directly to the SEC.5 Given the crucial
and vital role that whistleblowers play in enforcing securities laws,
“strong enforcement of the anti-retaliation protections is a critical
component of the SEC’s whistleblower program.”6As the SEC has stated,
“if individuals are not assured that they will be protected from retaliation
when they report internally, they will be less likely to report internally,
which could undermine the important role that internal compliance
programs play in helping the Commission prevent, detect, and stop
securities law violations.”7 With that in mind, the SEC brought a “first-
of-its-kind” enforcement action by filing a stand-alone whistleblower
retaliation case against a casino for firing an employee who reported
securities violations to his superiors.8 Regardless of the SEC’s desire to
protect internal whistleblowers, circuit courts are split9 on whether
Congress intended to extend protection to internal reporters under the
1. U.S. SEC. &EXCH. COMM’N, 2016ANNUALREPORT TOCONGRESS ONTHEDODD-
FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annual-
report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7246-LEJH].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 18.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id. at 2.
9. See infra Part II.A.
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank or the Act).10
The rise of corporate whistleblowers in recent years is largely due to
a provision under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which, among
other things, protects employees of publicly traded companies from
retaliation for their whistleblowing efforts by providing employees who
bring a successful retaliation claim under the Act with a number of
remedies. 11 Congress passed SOX in the wake of the Enron scandal12—
followed by the WorldCom scandal13—which ultimately led to the
dissolution of Arthur Anderson.14 SOX sought to “protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws”15 and required companies that issue public
securities to adopt a number of extensive accounting and auditing
procedures.16 To ensure companies complied with SOX, the statute
provides a private right of action to employees who are subject to
retaliation by their company after reporting securities law violations
internally.17 After all, the Enron scandal was uncovered largely because
of the efforts of internal whistleblowers.18
SOX was heralded by both politicians and scholars as the most
important piece of legislative financial reform since the Securities Act of
193319 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193420 (the “Exchange Act”).21
Whistleblower advocates also praised SOX for the extensive protections
10. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–
04 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)).
12. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1544 (2005).
13. Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious Failure and Its Toll on an Industry, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/18/business/worldcoms-
audacious-failure-and-its-toll-on-an-industry.html [https://perma.cc/T7XM-R6BE].
14. Arthur Andersen Goes Out of Business, ABCNEWS (Aug. 31, 2002),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Decade/arthur-andersen-business/story?id=9279255
[https://perma.cc/4W3H-HWFV].
15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, 745.
16. Id.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
18. SeeRichard E.Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. &MARY L. REV. 65, 67 (2007).
19. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012)).
20. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012)).
21. Moberly, supra note 18, at 68, 68 nn.8–10.
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offered to corporate whistleblowers, internal and external alike.22
However, SOX turned out to be underwhelming in at least two significant
ways: (1) it failed to protect whistleblowers;23 and (2) the measures
mandated by SOX failed to address the corporate governance and auditing
issues that led to Enron’s collapse.24 In the first three years after SOX was
passed, of the 361 whistleblower claims decided at the agency level, only
thirteen were found in favor of the whistleblower, and of the ninety-three
claims decided on appeal, only six were found in favor of the
whistleblower.25
Just eight years after the enactment of SOX and two years after the
Financial Crisis of 2008—and SOX’s inadequate performance as a tool
for proper corporate governance—Congress passed Dodd-Frank.26 The
Act’s purpose is to promote “the financial stability of the United States
by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to
end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
[and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.”27
To aid in accomplishing this purpose, Congress included a robust
whistleblower program in Dodd-Frank to be administered by the SEC.28
Unfortunately for many whistleblowers, some courts have found that
two provisions of the whistleblower section conflict, and the tension has
caused significant confusion. Section 78u-6(a)(6) (section (a)(6)) states
that a “whistleblower” is an individual who provides information
regarding securities violations “to the Commission, in a manner
established . . . by the Commission.”29 However, section 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (subsection (iii)) states that an employer may not retaliate
against a whistleblower for making disclosures protected under SOX.30
SOX protects employees who report internally rather than directly to the
22. Id. at 68.
23. Id. at 69–70.
24. See Romano, supra note 12.
25. Moberly, supra note 18, at 67.
26. Samuel C. Leifer, Note, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-
Frank Act, 113 MICH. L. REV. 121 (2014); see also Romano, supra note 12.
27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
28. Id. § 922, 124 Stat. 1841–49 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)); Leifer, supra
note 26, at 130–31.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
30. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
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Commission.31 Therefore, subsection (iii) expands the definition of a
whistleblower to include internal reporters, which contradicts the
definition found in section (a)(6). Circuit courts are split on what role
subsection (iii) plays in relation to section (a)(6). Does subsection (iii)
merely explain section (a)(6), in which case there is no tension, or does it
expand it, in which case there may be tension, or is the statute’s meaning
ambiguous enough to warrant Chevron32 deference to the SEC
interpretation? In other words, given these two potentially competing
provisions of Dodd-Frank, is there only one category of whistleblowers,
those or report directly to the SEC, does the Act include a second
category, those who report internally, or alternatively, is the Act
ambiguous?
This Note resolves that conflict by proposing an alternative reading
of the statute. This Note, unlike other scholarship that has addressed this
issue, claims neither that Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower
should be read to explicitly include those who report internally pursuant
to subsection (iii), nor that subsection (iii) causes tension with section
(a)(6).33 Rather, this Note argues that the current reading of section (a)(6)
overlooks a key portion of the statute. Section (a)(6) should not be read
narrowly to limit the definition of whistleblower to those who report
directly to the SEC. Instead, section (a)(6) should be read as a broad grant
of authority by Congress to the SEC to establish the manner in which an
individual provides information to the SEC and becomes a
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
32. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
33. See generally Kristin Goodchild, Note, Securities/Administrative Law—Internal
Reporters Who Blow the Whistle: Are They Protected Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Anti-
Retaliation Provision?, 38 W.NEWENG. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that courts facing this
issue in the future follow the Second Circuit’s interpretation that Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower provisions provide protection to internal reporters pursuant to the SEC’s
reasonable interpretation of the Act); Leifer, supra note 26 (arguing that a “remedial”
statute such as Dodd-Frank should be interpreted broadly to accomplish its goals and as
such the Act’s whistleblower provisions should be interpreted broadly to allow for
internal reporting, or in the alternative, courts unable to find a clear meaning within the
statue should defer to the SEC); Jeff Vogt, Note, Don’t Tell Your Boss? Blowing the
Whistle on the Fifth Circuit’s Elimination of Anti-Retaliation Protection for Internal
Whistleblowers Under Dodd-Frank, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 353, 366 (2015) (arguing that the
definition of the term “whistleblower” stated in section (a)(6) should not be applied to
the term “whistleblower” in section (h) pursuant to canons of statutory construction).
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whistleblower.34 In other words, this Note argues that Congress has not
explicitly defined what a whistleblower is in section (a)(6). Congress has
authorized the SEC to “establish[], by rule or regulation” the definition of
“whistleblower.”35 Therefore, it is permissible for the SEC to establish
that reporting violations through “internal company channels”36 is a
“manner” in which an individual may provide information to the SEC and
thereby become a whistleblower.37
Part I.A of this Note discusses a brief history of the circumstances
that led to the passing of SOX and Dodd-Frank, states the relevant texts
of the respective statutes, and provides the relevant parts of the SEC Rule
21F interpreting Dodd-Frank. Part I.B provides examples of three
different employees who reported violations of securities laws under the
SEC’s jurisdiction to their superiors rather than directly to the SEC. Part
II.A outlines the three circuit court cases addressing this issue and
examines some of the related secondary literature. Part II.B discusses
other statutes and cases that contain and analyze the language “in a
manner established,” the same language found in section (a)(6).38 The
analysis strongly suggests that this language is a broad grant of authority
to the recipient to administer their duties at their own prerogative. Part III
argues for a novel reading of Dodd-Frank under the framework provided
for in Part II.B. This reading of section (a)(6) suggests that Congress
conferred broad statutory authority on the Commission to determine the
way an individual becomes a whistleblower, rather than limit the
definition of a whistleblower to only those who report violations directly
to the SEC. This Note concludes by arguing that courts should adopt this
new framework when examining whether an individual is a whistleblower
under Dodd-Frank.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012); see also Vogt, supra note 33, at 380 (briefly
discussing a similar reading of section (a)(6)).
35. 15 U.S.C § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
36. Vogt, supra note 33, at 380.
37. 15 U.S.C § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
38. Id.
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I.WHAT IS AWHISTLEBLOWER ANDWHY DOWECAREABOUTTHEM
SOMUCH?
A. THECIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO THE PASSAGE OF SOX AND
DODD-FRANK
1. Enron and the Crash of 2002
In 2002, Enron filed for what was then the largest Chapter 11
bankruptcy in American history.39 At its height, each of Enron’s shares,
considered a blue-chip stock,40 were worth around $90, but plummeted to
under $1 at the end of 2001.41 Enron engaged in fraudulent accounting
practices by improperly recognizing revenues, using mark-to-market
accounting methods, and hiding its debt in hundreds of special purpose
entities or shell companies.42 These practices allowed Enron to
manipulate its balance sheet and misrepresent its true financial position
to both investors and regulators.43 In order to maximize their
compensation, Enron’s executives made increasingly riskier decisions
regarding investments and failed to conduct adequate due diligence.44 As
Enron lost on these risky bets it hid its debt in special purpose entities to
conceal its losses, which encouraged even riskier behavior in order to
39. Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview;
Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/03/business/enron-s-collapse-the-overview-enron-
corp-files-largest-us-claim-for-bankruptcy.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/QBJ6-
J9A6]. Surpassed by WorldCom later in 2002. Louisa Beltran, WorldCom Files Largest
Bankruptcy Ever, CNN MONEY (July 22, 2002, 10:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/20
02/07/19/news/worldcom_bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/XC5B-B6TW].
40. “A blue-chip stock is the stock of a large, well-established and financially sound
company that has operated for many years. A blue-chip stock typically has a market
capitalization in the billions [and] is generally the market leader or among the top three
companies in its sector.” Blue-Chip Stock, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/b/bluechipstock.asp [https://perma.cc/FBS8-FBDR] (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
41. Douglas O. Linder, Enron Historical Stock Price, FAMOUS TRIALS,
http://www.famous-trials.com/images/ftrials/Enron/documents/enronstockchart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FRT8-Z4X8] (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
42. Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of
Revenues and Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 97 (Nancy B. Rapaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); Paul M. Healy &
Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2003, at 10–11.
43. Healy & Palepu, supra note 42, at 11.
44. Id. at 13.
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recoup the losses.45 Finally, there was a significant conflict of interest
between Enron and its auditor, Arthur Anderson, one of the fifth largest
accounting firms in the world at the time.46 In return for looking the other
way and ignoring indications of Enron’s fraudulent practices, Anderson
earned enormously high fees, and actively helped Enron engage in
fraudulent corporate conduct.47 As a result, Arthur Anderson was
dissolved for its part in the larger Enron scandal.48
2. The Rise of Whistleblowers and the Enactment of SOX
Soon after Enron and WorldCom collapsed, and in response to the
stock market crash of the early 2000’s, Congress passed SOX.49 One of
the ways SOX seeks to combat corporate fraud is through an increased
reliance on whistleblowers.50 After all, it was whistleblowers who were
largely responsible for uncovering the abuses at Enron.51 SOX provides a
private right of action for whistleblowers who have been retaliated against
for making disclosures required by SOX.52 This means that individuals
who report their employ’s fraudulent activity may bring a lawsuit against
the company, if the company retaliates against the individual for
disclosing the unlawful activity. Section 1514A(a)(1)(C) states:
No [publicly traded] company . . . or any . . . agent of such company .
. . may . . . discriminate against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
employee—to provide information, cause information to be provided,
or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding [a violation of federal
securities laws], when the information or assistance is provided to or
the investigation is conducted by—a person with supervisory
authority over the employee (or such other person working for the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id.
48. Arthur Andersen Goes Out of Business, supra note 14.
49. Leifer, supra note 26, at 126.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 127.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (entitles “[c]ivil action to protect against retaliation
in fraud cases”).
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employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate
misconduct).53
No employer may discriminate against an employee reporting a
potential securities fraud internally. If an employee thinks they have been
unlawfully retaliated against, they may file a complaint with the Secretary
of Labor, or if the Secretary takes more than 180 days to decide whether
or not to pursue the claim, bring a complaint in federal district court.54 If
the appropriate authority determines an employee was indeed unlawfully
retaliated against, the employee is “entitled to all relief necessary to make
the employee whole.”55 Making the employee whole includes, but is not
limited to: “(A) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the
employee would have had, but for the discrimination; (B) the amount of
back pay, with interest; and (C) compensation for any special damages
sustained as a result of the discrimination.”56
3. The Financial Crisis of 2008 and Recommitment to Whistleblowers in
Dodd-Frank
SOX did not live up to its promises, however,57 and, just six years
later, the world saw the Financial Crisis of 2008, the largest since the
Great Depression. In the wake of the 2008 crisis and SOX’s shortcomings
as a tool for proper corporate governance, Congress passed a “near-
comprehensive” statute: Dodd-Frank.58 The Act was enacted to promote
“the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect
the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers
from abusive financial services practices.”59 Recognizing both the
significant role that whistleblowers can play in a financial regulatory
scheme, but also SOX’s inadequacy in that regard, Congress sought to
increase whistleblower engagement with Dodd-Frank.60 Thus, Dodd-
53. Id. § 1514A(a)(1).
54. Id. § 1514A(b)(1).
55. Id. § 1514A(c)(1).
56. Id. § 1514A(c)(2).
57. Moberly, supra note 18, at 69–70.
58. Leifer, supra note 26.
59. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
60. Leifer, supra note 26, at 131.
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Frank provides for “[s]ecurities whistleblower incentives and
protection.”61 This codified Congress’s renewed intent to rely on
whistleblowers as an integral tool in the fight against securities fraud.62
a. The Definition of a Whistleblower
Section 78u-6 begins by defining a number of terms, including
“whistleblower”: “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals
acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”63
b. Whistleblower Awards
Section (b), the awards section, provides the “incentives” for
whistleblowers by declaring that the SEC will pay an award to
whistleblowers who provide information to the Commission in
accordance with the Act.64
c. Award Amount Determination
In addition, the Act provides that “the determination of the amount
of an award made under []section (b) shall be in the discretion of the
Commission.”65 When determining how much of an award to give the
whistleblower, the Commission should consider:
(I) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower
to the success of the covered judicial or administrative action;
(II) the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any
legal representative of the whistleblower in a covered judicial or
administrative action;
(III) the programmatic interest of the Commission in deterring
violations of the securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
62. Leifer, supra note 26, at 131.
63. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
64. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1).
65. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A).
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who provide information that lead to the successful enforcement of
such laws; and
(IV) such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish
by rule or regulation.66
However, the Commission may not pay an award:
(C) to any whistleblower who gains the information through the
performance of an audit of financial statements required under the
securities laws and for whom such submission would be contrary to
the requirements of [15 U.S.C. § 78j-1]; or
(D) to any whistleblower who fails to submit information to the
Commission in such form as the Commission may, by rule, require.67
d. Whistleblower Protections
Section (h), or the anti-retaliation provision, of the Act provides the
“protection” given to whistleblowers.68 The anti-retaliation provision
states that an employer may not discriminate against a whistleblower in
the terms and conditions of employment because of a lawful act done by
the whistleblower:
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with
[such] section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or
judicial administrative action of the Commission based upon or
related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under [SOX],
this chapter, including [15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)], [18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)],
and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.69
The Act provides for a private right of action for someone who
claims they were retaliated against in violation of the anti-retaliation
66. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B).
67. Id. § 78u-6(c)(2).
68. Id. § 78u-6(h).
69. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
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provision.70 Those individuals who win are entitled to: “(i) reinstatement
with the same seniority status that the individual would have had, but for
the discrimination; (ii) 2 times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to
the individual, with interest; and (iii) compensation for litigation costs,
expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”71
4. The SEC’s Rule Interpreting Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
In 2011, the SEC promulgated Rule 21F to “describe the
whistleblower program that the Commission has established to implement
the provisions of section 21F, and explain the procedures [that] will need
to [be] follow[ed] in order to be eligible for an award.”72 Rule 21F-2 sets
forth the criteria for qualifying as a whistleblower.73 Section (a) defines
whether an individual is a “whistleblower”:
(1) You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you
provide the Commission with information pursuant to the procedures
set forth in [17 C.F.R.] § 240.21F–9(a)], and the information relates
to a possible violation of the Federal securities laws (including any
rules or regulations thereunder) that has occurred, is ongoing or is
about to occur. . . .
(2) To be eligible for an award, you must submit original information
to the Commission in accordance with the procedures and conditions
described in [17 C.F.R.] §§ 240.21F–4, 240.21F–8, and 240.21F–9.74
Section (b) prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers:
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by Section
21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)), you are a
whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are
providing relates to a possible securities law violation (or, where
applicable, to a possible violation of the provisions set forth in 18
U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur,
and;
70. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
71. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1 (2012).
73. Id. § 240.21F-2.
74. Id. § 240.21F-2(a).
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(ii) you provide that information in a manner described in section
21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)).
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you satisfy
the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.75
Through Rule 21F-2, the SEC created two categories of
whistleblowers: (1) those who report directly to the Commission and
qualify for both an award and protection, and (2) those who report
internally and not to the Commission, and only qualify for protection, but
no reward.76 However, the SEC’s regulation is not dispositive unless
Congress has explicitly given the agency the power and authority to make
such a determination, or the statute is sufficiently ambiguous.77
B. THE THREEWHISTLEBLOWERS
Three separate accounts of employees who were fired after reporting
potential violations of securities fraud to their superiors are outlined
below.
1. Khaled Asadi
Khaled Asadi claimed he was terminated from his position at GE
Energy (GE) for informing his superiors that GE’s practices constituted
potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act78 (FCPA) as well
as the company’s policies.79 From 2006 until 2011, Asadi worked as GE’s
Iraq Country Executive, a country he maintained dual citizenship with in
addition to the United States.80 At first, Asadi was able to work from the
United States, but was eventually asked to relocate to another office in
Amman, Jordan, and he willingly obliged.81 As the Iraq Country
Executive, Asadi was responsible for communicating with Iraq’s
75. Id. § 240.21F-2(b).
76. Id.
77. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
78. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012)).
79. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, Civil Action No. 4:12-345, 2012 WL
2522599, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),
L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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governing bodies in order to acquire and maintain energy service
contracts for GE.82 In June 2010, GE was in the middle of negotiations
with the Iraqi government over a joint-venture.83 These negotiations were
particularly contentious because such agreements were not allowed under
Iraqi contract law.84
Under the FCPA, it is illegal to bribe or curry special favor with
foreign government officials.85During negotiations between GE and Iraq,
the Iraqi Senior Deputy Minister of Electricity (the Deputy Minister)
asked GE to hire Iman Mahmood, a woman with close personal ties to the
Deputy Minister.86 An Iraqi government insider came to Asadi because
he was concerned GE hired Mahmood specifically to gain the Iraqi
government and the Deputy Minister’s favor while bargaining for this
lucrative deal.87 Worried that these actions might violate the FCPA and
ruin the deal between GE and the Iraqi government, Asadi informed his
superior, Joseph Anix, a Regional Executive for GE.88 Asadi also took the
extra step of disclosing this information to the ombudsperson89 for GE,
who subsequently interviewed Asadi about his report.90
Up until the interview with the ombudsperson for GE, Asadi claimed
he had received ten consecutive positive performance reviews, but that
shortly after the interview he received a surprisingly negative review.91 In
addition, the review did not mention the actual performance issues that
caused Asadi to receive a negative review, nor did it give him the chance
to alter whatever practice or behavior the company disapproved of.92
Before the negative review, GE had extended Asadi’s assignment for
another two years.93 However, after Asadi’s internal report, interview
with the ombudsperson, and negative review, the company’s attitude
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
86. Asadi, 2012 WL 2522599, at *1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. “An official appointed to investigate individuals’ complaints against a company
or organization, especially a public authority.” Ombudsman, OXFORD LIVING
DICTIONARIES: ENG., https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ombudsman [https://p
erma.cc/M5EW-RSCF] (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
90. Asadi, 2012 WL 2522599, at *1.
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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towards Asadi took a distinct negative turn.94 Asadi claims he started to
receive pressure to give up his position.95 Anix pressured him to take on
a new role with minimal responsibilities in the region.96 What followed
were allegedly frequent and intimidating severance negotiations from GE
towards Asadi.97 Ultimately, GE cut off all communication with Asadi
and fired him.98 Asadi filed a complaint in federal district court.99
2. Daniel Berman
Daniel Berman claimed he was terminated from his position at
Neo@Ogilvy LLC (Neo) for informing his superiors that Neo’s practices
constituted accounting fraud and potential violations of generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), SOX, and Dodd-Frank.100 From
October 2010 until April 2013, Berman was the finance director of Neo.101
He handled Neo and its parent company’s internal accounting procedures,
as well as, Neo’s financial reporting and compliance with GAAP.102
During his tenure at Neo, Berman claims he uncovered material
compliance failures, accounting irregularities, and accounting fraud.103
Specifically, Berman alleged that four different actions taken by Neo were
potential violations that he reported internally: “(1) delayed payments to
media companies; (2) improperly recognized revenues; (3) reversed
accounting reserves; and (4) lenient payment terms.”104
As part of its business, Neo receives cash deposits from its clients
and purchases advertisements on the client’s behalf from third-party
vendors.105 A client places an order and Neo, on behalf of the client, uses
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-CV-00523(GHW)(SN), 2014 WL
6865718, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014), report and recommendation adopted in part,
rejected in part, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 801 F.3d 145
(2d Cir. 2015), report and recommendation adopted in part, No. 1:14-CV-523-GHW-
SN, 2016 WL 815158 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *2.
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the client’s cash it has in reserve, to pay a vendor for advertising space.106
In August 2012, however, Berman realized that the cash reserves held on
behalf of Neo’s clients were growing at a surprisingly fast rate.107 After
investigating, Berman discovered that Neo was temporarily withholding
payments to the advertising vendors in order to improperly improve its
own financial position.108 In other words, Neo effectively took short-term,
interest free loans from its clients without the clients’ knowledge or
consent.109 The delayed payments largely affected the IBM account and
were approved by, Bradley Rogers, a senior officer at Neo.110 Berman
worried that Neo’s financial statements would mislead investors and took
two actions: (1) he reported this activity to his superiors; (2) he caused
Neo’s parent company to review and correct the issues.111 Because
Berman’s superiors reviewed his findings and subsequently remedied the
situation, Rogers was upset with Berman, and sought to retaliate against
him.112
In January and February 2013, Rogers also improperly recognized
revenues to try and increase Neo’s profits for his own benefit and personal
gain, and tried to reverse Neo’s accounting reserves to again increase
Neo’s profits.113 Berman reported the January incident to his superiors,
who rectified the potential violations, but Rogers was once again upset
with Berman, and Berman did not report the February incident.114 In
March 2013, a client—with whom a senior level Neo executive had a
personal relationship with—was provided unorthodox payment terms that
did not comply with internal policies.115 Berman tried to ensure, much to
the chagrin of the senior level executive, that the transaction was properly
reported on Neo’s financial statements in accordance with GAAP
practices and the parent company’s policies.116 As a result, the senior
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id.
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executive was upset with Berman, and shortly afterwards Berman’s
employment with Neo was terminated.117
Despite his contentious termination, Berman still tried to help Neo
comply with the law.118 He alerted the Chief Financial Officer of North
America of Neo’s parent company to what happened and also, through
his lawyer, alerted the Chair of the audit Committee of Neo’s parent
company.119 Even though the committee agreed to have an internal auditor
interview Berman, the company denied any wrongdoing, refused to
rectify the fraudulent activities reported by Berman, or rehire him.120 In
response, Berman filed a report with the SEC regarding Neo’s potential
securities violations and a complaint in federal district court.121
3. Paul Somers
Paul Somers claimed he was terminated from his position at Digital
Realty for informing his superiors about company practices that
constituted a potential SOX violation.122 From July 2010 until April 2014
Somers was the Vice President of Portfolio Management at Digital Realty
in Europe and then Singapore.123 While in Singapore, Somers’ supervisor
was the Senior Vice President for the Asian Pacific Region, Kris
Kumar.124 While Somers was working under Kumar, Kumar took actions
that eliminated internal control, allegedly in violation of SOX—which
Somers subsequently reported to senior management.125 Specifically,
Kumar allegedly committed serious acts of misconduct, including failing
to disclose seven million dollars of cost over run on a development.126
Shortly after making his report, however, Somers was terminated, and
subsequently filed a complaint in federal district court.127
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092 (N.D. Cal.
2015), aff’d, 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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II. THECURRENTREADING OF “WHISTLEBLOWER” INDODD-FRANK
A. THECIRCUIT SPLIT
The three whistleblowers described in Part I.B of this Note were, in
fact, the three “whistleblowers” (or not, as well shall see) featured in the
circuit court decisions in the Fifth, Second, and Ninth Circuits,
respectively.128 All three of courts faced the same issue—do Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower protections extended to employees who report
alleged securities violations to their superiors, rather than to the SEC, and
are then retaliated against? Or, alternatively, is the answer to that question
sufficiently ambiguous to warrant Chevron deference to the SEC’s
interpretation of the statute. The question has created a deep split among
the circuits and all three offer different answers. But in order to arrive at
their individual answers, all three circuits asked the same two questions:
(1) do these employees’ actions fit the definition of whistleblower found
in section (a)(6); and (2) does subsection (iii) expand the definition of a
whistleblower to also include these employee’s actions?
1. The Circuits Agree Section (a)(6) Defines “Whistleblower” as Solely
Those Individuals who Provide Information to the Commission
According to section (a)(6), “[t]he term ‘whistleblower’ means any
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission.”129 Despite their disagreements, the three courts all read
section (a)(6) to mean the same thing—the only way to become a
whistleblower is to provide information of alleged securities fraud
directly to the SEC.130 In other words, someone who reports alleged
securities fraud to their superiors and not to the SEC fails to qualify as a
whistleblower under section (a)(6). In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) L.L.C.,
the Fifth Circuit stated, “[section (a)(6)], standing alone, expressly and
unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to the
128. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013); Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d
1045 (9th Cir. 2017).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
130. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623; Berman, 801 F.3d at 150; Somers, 850 F.3d at 1048.
2017] A NOVEL APPROACH TO DEFINING 277
"WHISTLEBLOWER" IN DODD-FRANK
SEC to qualify as a “whistleblower” for purposes of § 78u–6.”131 The
court later reiterated its position by stating, “Under Dodd–Frank’s plain
language and structure, there is only one category of whistleblowers:
individuals who provide information relating to a securities law violation
to the SEC.”132 In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, the Second Circuit stated
that the issue was not whether the language “‘provide . . . to the
Commission’ . . . means something other than what it literally says.”133
The court clarified that “[it] do[es] not doubt that ‘provide . . . to the
Commission’ means ‘provide . . . to the Commission.’”134 In Somers v.
Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., the Ninth Circuit stated, “[section (a)(6)] thus
describes only those who report information to the SEC.”135 Therefore,
because none of the plaintiffs reported the respective alleged securities
fraud directly to the SEC, but instead reported only to their internal
superiors before being retaliated against, none of these plaintiffs are
considered whistleblowers under section (a)(6).
2. The Circuits Disagree About the Role Subsection (iii) Plays in
Relation to Section (a)(6)
All three courts disagree, however, regarding what role subsection
(iii) plays in relation to section (a)(6), given that section (a)(6) limits the
definition of a whistleblower to those who report to the SEC. In each case,
the employee-claimant argues that, despite the language of section (a)(6),
they are nonetheless entitled to the Act’s protections because of the
language in subsection (iii). They contend that subsection (iii) expands
the definition of a whistleblower and extends protections to also include
employees who report alleged securities violations to their superiors
rather than just to those who report to the SEC. The plaintiffs argue that
such activity is protected because Congress intended to incorporate
SOX’s internal disclosure protections into Dodd-Frank by making it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for
“making disclosures that are required or protected under [SOX].”136 At
the very least, the employee-claimants asked the courts to find that the
ambiguity caused by the tension between the two provisions was enough
131. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
132. Id. at 625.
133. Berman, 801 F.3d at 150 (first omission in original).
134. Id. at 150 n.4.
135. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1048.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
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to warrant deference to Rule 21F-2(b)(ii), which provides that employees
who report internally are whistleblowers for purposes of Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation section.137
a. Subsection (iii) Only Explains the Definition Found in Section (a)(6)
and Does Not Expand that Definition According to the Fifth Circuit
In Asadi, a case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit held that the
definition found in section (a)(6) was controlling.138 Subsection (h)(1)(A)
is neither an expansion of the definition of a whistleblower found in
section (a)(6), nor is it an additional definition. Instead, subsection
(h)(1)(A) is merely a description of the protections afforded to those who
meet the definition of “whistleblower” found in section (a)(6).139 As the
court states, “the three categories listed in subparagraph § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)
represent the protected activity in a whistleblower-protection claim. They
do not, however, define which individuals qualify as whistleblowers.”140
In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that the language of
subsection (A) unambiguously answered “two questions: (1) who is
protected; and (2) what actions by protected individuals constitute
protected activity.”141 Who is protected? The answer is unambiguously “a
whistleblower,” therefore the statute only protects a whistleblower who
engages in protected conduct.142 A “whistleblower” is an individual who
satisfies the definition in section (a)(6).143 What is protected activity?
Protected activity is activity engaged in, only by someone who already
qualifies as a whistleblower, that falls under one of the three provisions
of subsection (h)(1)(A).144
In addition, the Fifth Circuit found that just because a person can
engage in protected activity and yet not be considered a whistleblower,
does not necessarily create conflict between these two provisions.145
According to the Fifth Circuit, the use of the word “whistleblower”
instead of “individual” or “employee” in the anti-retaliation section was
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(ii).
138. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 626.
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clear evidence that Congress intended that only those who met the
definition of whistleblower in section (a)(6) should receive the statutes’
anti-retaliation protections.146 Moreover, such a reading would not render
subsection (iii) superfluous, but would serve a valid purpose.147 The court
offered the example of a mid-level manager or executive who learns of a
securities law violation and simultaneously reports his findings to both
the Chief Executive Officer (the CEO) and the SEC, but the CEO is
unaware of the disclosure to the SEC.148 The CEO then immediately fires
the employee, but because the CEO was unaware of the manager’s report
to the SEC, the manager is not protected by either subsections (i) or (ii)
of the statute.149 The employee would, however, be protected under
subsection (iii) because his disclosure to the CEO was protected by SOX,
which is incorporated into the Act through subsection (iii).150 Therefore,
subsection (iii) protects individuals who make simultaneous disclosures
both internally and to the SEC, and is not superfluous.151
Furthermore, the court found that reading subsection (iii) in a way
that extends protections to those who reported internally rather than just
to the SEC renders section 1514A of SOX obsolete and useless.152 Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower protections and reliefs are more generous than
those found in SOX, so there would be no point in filing a claim under
SOX.153 Specifically, the amount of back pay, access to the courts, and
the statute of limitations are far more generous for claimants in Dodd-
Frank than SOX because the Act:154 (1) grants two times back pay, while
SOX only grants regular back pay; (2) permits a claim to be filed directly
in federal court, while under SOX, a claim must first be filed with the
Department of Labor (the DoL) before going to court; and (3) allows
claims to be filed up to ten years after the violation, while SOX only
allows claims to be filed between 180 days after the violation occurred
and 180 days after the employee became aware of the violation.155 If
Asadi’s reading of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation protections were true,
146. Id.
147. Id. at 627.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 628.
153. Id. at 628–29.
154. Id. at 629.
155. Id.
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the court found that the Act’s whistleblower provisions would be rendered
moot because it is unlikely that a claim under SOX would be filed.156
Finally, the court found that deference to Rule 21F—interpreting
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provision’s to extend protection to
employees who reported internally—was unwarranted.157 Deference to
the SEC’s rule is only called for if Congress explicitly provided for such
deference, or if Congress’s intentions are ambiguous enough to warrant
it.158Here, however, Congress already answered the question by explicitly
defining a whistleblower as one who provides information to the
Commission in section (a)(6), and therefore the SEC deserved no
deference under Chevron.159
b. It Is Unclear What Role Subsection (iii) Plays and Therefore the SEC
Rule Deserves Chevron Deference According to the Second Circuit
In Berman, the Second Circuit held that the conflicting language of
section (a)(6) and subsection (iii) was sufficiently ambiguous to defer to
the SEC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank.160 The Second Circuit agreed
with the Fifth Circuit that, given the example of an employee
simultaneously complaining to both their employer and the SEC, under a
very narrow reading of the statute there is no “absolute conflict” between
section (a)(6) and subsection (iii).161 However, the court found that such
a reading would leave subsection (iii) with an “extremely limited
scope.”162
First, few employees may engage in simultaneous reporting.163 The
court reasoned that many employees would probably conclude that by
reporting the matter solely to their employer it would be handled
appropriately with little chance of retaliation.164 However, from the
employee’s perspective, “reporting to a government agency creates a
substantial risk of retaliation.”165 Second, the Fifth Circuit’s reading
156. Id.
157. Id. at 630.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015).
161. Id. at 150.
162. Id. at 151.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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would exclude, the whistleblowers who are required by law to report
internally first before reporting to a government agency, namely auditors
and lawyers.166
Under subsection 78j-1 of the Exchange Act—a provision of SOX
explicitly referenced in subsection (iii)—auditors of public companies are
required in some instances to report illegal activity to internal
management.167Moreover, SOX requires an auditor to report to the Board
of Directors (the Board) of the company if the activity in the auditor’s
initial report is not remedied.168 Finally, auditors are only permitted to
contact the SEC if both the Board and management ignore the auditor’s
reports.169 Therefore, if the Fifth Circuit’s reading of subsection (iii) were
correct, then an auditor would have “almost no Dodd-Frank protection”
because the retaliation would likely precede any report to the Commission
while the auditor awaits a response from the company.170 Attorneys are
also subject to similar requirements under SOX and the SEC’s Standards
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (“Attorney Standards”).171 Under
15 U.S.C. § 7245(1), attorneys of public companies are required to
disclose illegal securities activity to the Chief Legal Counsel or CEO.172
In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 7245(2) requires an attorney to disclose the illegal
activity to the appropriate committee of the Board if the CEO or Chief
Legal Counsel do not respond to the attorney.173 Further, Rule 3 of the
SEC’s Attorney Standards also encourages attorneys to report internally
before going to the SEC.174
Unfortunately, an inquiry into the legislative history of Dodd-Frank
did not shed any light on Congress’s intent for subsection (iii) and
whether or not Congress intended for the Act to have such a narrow
scope.175 Subsection (iii) only came to be during conference after it was
passed by both the House and the Senate, and is not mentioned in any
legislative materials.176 In light of “the realities of the legislative process,”
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B) (2012)).
168. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(2) (2012)).
169. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(3)(B) (2012)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 151–52 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2012)).
172. Id. at 152.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2012)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 153.
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the court is not surprised that the tension between section (a)(6) and
subsection (iii) went unnoticed at such a late stage of the process.177When
Congress passed the final bill there was no indication of whether they
intended subsection (iii) to be limited by section (a)(6), and as the court
has demonstrated, the text of the statute does not offer a definitive
answer.178
In the end, the court decided it did not need to figure out exactly what
the scope of subsection (iii) was or its relationship to section (a)(6).179
According to the court, the tension between section (a)(6) and subsection
(iii) produces sufficient ambiguity to warrant granting Chevron deference
to the SEC if it has a reasonable interpretation of the statute.180 The court
found SEC Rule 21F-2(b)(1) reasonably interprets the statute to allow
employees who report internally a right of private action in court under
Dodd-Frank.181 Therefore, those employees, including Berman, may file
a claim in federal court.182
c. Section (a)(6) and Section (h)(1)(a) Define Two Distinct Categories
of “Whistleblower” and Are Not in Conflict with Each Other According
to the Ninth Circuit
In Somers, the Ninth Circuit went a step beyond the Second Circuit
and held that the text of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions explicitly
extends protection to both those who report to the SEC and to those who
report internally.183 According to the court, subsection (iii)’s “language
illuminates congressional intent.”184 By sweeping in SOX’s
whistleblower provisions, retaliation by a publicly traded employer
against an employee who makes an internal report to a supervisor is
definitively barred by Dodd-Frank.185 As previously noted, SOX dictates
that both auditors and attorneys go through various stages of internal
reporting before disclosing anything to the SEC, and would be left with
little to no Dodd-Frank protections because they would undoubtedly be
177. Id. at 154.
178. Id. at 154–55.
179. Id. at 155.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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fired before getting the opportunity to inform the SEC.186 Therefore, the
definition of “whistleblower” found in section (a)(6) should not control
the definition of “whistleblower” found in subsection (h)(1)(A).187
Moreover, the court held that section (a)(6) and subsection (iii) were
not in conflict with each other. According to the court, depending on the
context, “whistleblower” can mean two different things in two different
parts of a statute, or as the court states, “terms can have different operative
consequences in different contexts.”188 That the statute includes a
definitional section is not dispositive of the issue: “[Statutory d]efinitions
are, after all, just one indication of meaning—a very strong indication, to
be sure, but nonetheless one that can be contradicted by other
indications.”189 With that in mind, the court held that the text of Dodd-
Frank’s anti-retaliation section explicitly extends protection in either
scenario; both to those who report to the SEC or to those who report
internally.190
Interpreting the statute to the contrary would not only defy
congressional intent, but would also reduce subsection (iii) to the point of
absurdity.191 Only those employees who made simultaneous reports
internally and to the Commission, who were then fired only for making
the internal report would fall under its protection, and as the Second
Circuit has noted, that situation is an unlikely one.192 Employees are more
likely to report to only one of the two, and while reporting to the SEC has
a better chance of rectifying the issue, it also has a better chance of
subjecting the employee to retaliation.193 On the other hand, while
reporting internally may be less effective in addressing the problem, it is
also less risky for the employee.194 Using the section (a)(6) definition in
subsection (iii) would do nothing to protect employees who are prohibited
from reporting directly to the SEC from immediate retaliation.195
Therefore, application of section (a)(6) to subsection (iii) would render
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
189. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 228 (2012)).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1049–50.
194. Id. at 1050.
195. Id.
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subsection (iii) moot, conflicting with the canons of statutory
construction.196
The court acknowledged the Fifth Circuit’s argument that reading
subsection (iii) to allow internal reporting would make SOX moot or
superfluous, however, the court disagreed.197 Two important distinctions
exist between the protection afforded to whistleblowers in SOX and
Dodd-Frank as noted in an amicus brief submitted by the SEC:198 (1) SOX
dictates that the DoL make the claim for the whistleblower and handle the
case throughout the administrative review and all the way through
appeal,199 while filing a complaint under Dodd-Frank requires the
claimant to go to federal court, which can be costly and stressful;200 and
(2) SOX allows an employee to recover for special damages related to the
retaliation including emotional distress, while Dodd-Frank only provides
for awards of double back pay.201 If an employee has suffered more than
just financial harm, then a SOX claim is better suited for their situation.202
SOX is therefore not superfluous if subsection (iii) is read to include
employees who report internally.203
The court concluded that subsection (iii) grants protection to internal
whistleblowers and SEC reporters alike and therefore the Ninth Circuit’s
holding was in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s holding.204 The Fifth
Circuit claims there is only one category of whistleblower, those who
reported to the Commission, and those individuals were entitled to the
incentives and protections of the Act. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
maintains there can be more than one category of whistleblower
depending on the context of the word, and that such context determines
who receives Dodd-Frank’s protections. Finally, if, as the Second Circuit
has found, there exists sufficient ambiguity or tension between section
(a)(6) and subsection (iii), then the court should defer to the SEC.205 The
SEC has passed a reasonable regulation stating internal whistleblowers
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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are protected under subsection (iii), resolving the ambiguity, so the matter
is settled.206
d. The Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit Briefly Weigh in
The Supreme Court never directly addressed the issue, but in
deciding a case about the language of SOX, it did touch on the topic of
internal reporters under Dodd-Frank.207 In Lawson v. FMR LLC, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if protections under SOX
extend only to employees of the company committing the violations, or
also to employees of contractors and subcontractors who work for the
company.208 The Court held “based on the text of § 1514A, the mischief
to which Congress was responding, and earlier legislation Congress drew
upon, that the provision shelters employees of private contractors and
subcontractors, just as it shelters employees of the public company served
by the contractors and subcontractors.”209 The defendant-company
claimed the passage of Dodd–Frank was evidence that Congress did not
wish to extend SOX protections to contractor employees because they
were already covered by Dodd-Frank.210 The Supreme Court dismissed
that argument and commented on the purview of Dodd-Frank.211 The
Court stated, Dodd-Frank “prohibit[s] any employer from retaliating
against ‘a whistleblower’ for providing information to the SEC,
participating in an SEC proceeding, or making disclosures required or
protected under Sarbanes–Oxley and certain other securities laws.”212
Further, “Section 1514A’s protections include employees who provide
information to ‘any person with supervisory authority over the
employee.’”213 “Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower provision, however,
focuses primarily on reporting to federal authorities.”214 Fortunately for
whistleblowers, the Court ultimately stated, “[i]f anything relevant to our
inquiry can be gleaned from Dodd–Frank, it is that Congress apparently
206. Id. at 1051.
207. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014).
208. Id. (such as investment advisers, law firms, and accounting firms).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1174.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1175 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2012)).
214. Id.
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does not share FMR’s concerns about extending protection
comprehensively to corporate whistleblowers.”215
The Sixth Circuit briefly noted that before Dodd-Frank was enacted,
an employee who alleged unlawful retaliation for reporting suspected
securities fraud was forced to file a complaint with the DoL rather than
being able to go directly to district court.216 However, when Dodd-Frank
was passed whistleblowers had another option because the Act “created a
private right of action allowing employees who believe they have been
retaliated against for engaging in protected activity under § 1514A to file
suit directly in federal court.”217
B.WHATROLEDOES THE LANGUAGE “IN AMANNER ESTABLISHED”
FULFILL?
The Fifth, Second, and Ninth Circuits all considered whether
subsection (iii) conflicts with section (a)(6), but neglected to examine the
entire definition of “whistleblower” in section (a)(6). As the Fifth Circuit
stated, the language “‘to the Commission,’ . . . expressly and
unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to the
SEC to qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ for purposes of § 78u–6.”218
However, this reading of section (a)(6) overlooks that the information
provided to the SEC must be provided “in a manner established, by rule
or regulation, by the Commission.”219 Therefore, none of the circuits gave
effect to the entire definition of “whistleblower” in section (a)(6).
1. The Role of “in a Manner Established” According to the Second
Circuit
In Stryker v. SEC, the Second Circuit considered the meaning of “in
a manner established.”220 The court considered the definition of “original
information” and whether a plaintiff may bring a claim for a Dodd-Frank
Act whistleblower award even though the information was submitted
215. Id.
216. Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Invs., Inc., 787 F.3d 797, 804 (6th Cir. 2015).
217. Id. at 805.
218. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013)
(emphasis in original).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
220. Stryker v. SEC, 780 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2015).
2017] A NOVEL APPROACH TO DEFINING 287
"WHISTLEBLOWER" IN DODD-FRANK
before the Act was passed.221 In recognizing that Congress left the
definition of original information vague, the court found that Congress
intended for the whistleblower to “provide the requisite information in the
form and manner required by the SEC’s rules and regulations,” and cited
to section (a)(6).222 This suggests that Congress included the language “in
a manner established” to be used as a tool by the SEC to dictate such
administrative things as: when an individual may provide information, the
form or document information should be provided on, and whether the
information should be provided over the phone or online.
2. Other Courts Have Analyzed “in a manner established” in Other
Statutes and Found the Language Should be Read as a Broad Grant of
Power
a. Northern District of California and Litmon
In Litmon v. Brown, a federal magistrate judge reviewed the
language, “in a manner established.”223 California law dictates that certain
individuals, those deemed as sexually violent predators pursuant to §
6600 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, must verify their
address every ninety days “in a manner established by the Department of
Justice.”224 The California Department of Justice (DOJ) had established
that these individuals must verify their address in person at a police
station.225 The plaintiff alleged that a rule requiring sex offenders to
register in person was ultra vires.226 The court disagreed and found that
the DOJ acted pursuant to the authority given to it by the statute.227 The
language “in a manner established” found in the statute, “explicitly
delegates to the DOJ determination of the ‘manner’ in which those
adjudicated as [sexually violent predators] must verify their residence and
employment.”228 Therefore, the DOJ rule is consistent with the text of the
221. Id. at 164–65.
222. Id. at 166.
223. Litmon v. Brown, No. C-10-3894 EMC, 2011 WL 873162 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14,
2011).
224. Id. at *1 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.012(b) (West 2017)).
225. Id.
226. Id. at *3.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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statute; “in-person registration is a ‘manner’ by which [a sexually violent]
individual may be made to verify their residence.”229
b. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to analyze the phrase “in
such manner as”230 as early as 1892.231 InMcPherson v. Blacker, the Court
interpreted Article 3, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution which reads:
“[e]ach State shall appoint, in suchManner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”232
The Court held, “the insertion of [‘in such manner as,’] while operating
as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the
legislative power, cannot be held to operate as a limitation on that power
itself.”233 In other words, the phrase “in such manner as” limits the ability
of the State to circumscribe the legislative power, but does limit the
legislative power itself.234
The Supreme Court has analyzed the words “in such manner as” in
two other cases: Wisconsin v. City of New York235 and Utah v. Evans.236
In these cases the Court reviewed the Census Clause of the Constitution
which requires, “the actual Enumeration” of each State’s population
“within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress . . . in such
Manner as they shall by Law direct.”237 InWisconsin v. City of New York,
the Supreme Court held, “[t]he Constitution’s text vests Congress with
virtually unlimited discretion in conducting the ‘actual Enumeration,’ see
Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Congress may conduct the census ‘in such Manner as
they shall by Law direct’), and there is no basis for thinking that such
discretion is more limited than that text provides.”238 In Utah, the
Supreme Court held, “[t]he final part of the sentence says that the ‘actual
Enumeration’ shall take place ‘in such Manner as’ Congress itself ‘shall
229. Id.
230. “In a manner established” is synonymous with “in such manner as.”
231. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
232. Id. at 24 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2).
233. Id. at 25.
234. Id.
235. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996).
236. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
238. Wisconsin, 517 U.S. at 2.
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by Law direct,’ thereby suggesting the breadth of congressional
methodological authority, rather than its limitation.”239
These Supreme Court cases strongly support the argument that the
language “in a manner established” and “in such manner as” grant
broad discretion and authority to the recipient to determine how to best
accomplish its goals.
III. CONGRESS INTENDED FOR THEEXPERTS AT THE SEC TOUSE
THEIREXPERTISE TODECIDEWHAT AWHISTLEBLOWER IS
A. SECTION (A)(6) SHOULDBEREAD AS ABROADGRANT OFAUTHORITY
TO THE SEC TODETERMINE THEWAY AN INDIVIDUALBECOMES A
WHISTLEBLOWER
The three circuit courts to address the question of whether or not an
employee who reports internally rather than to the SEC have all focused
narrowly on the role that subsection (iii) plays.240 However, giving effect
to the entirety of section (a)(6) provides a better framework under which
to analyze this issue.241 The plain meaning of the language, “provides . . .
information . . . to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission,” is an explicit grant of statutory authority
by Congress to the SEC to “establish” the “manner” in which an
individual provides information to the SEC and becomes a
whistleblower.242 Therefore, the SEC has the statutory authority and
prerogative to “establish” that an employee who reports internally is a
“manner” by which the employee may qualify as a whistleblower for
purposes of Dodd-Frank’s protections.243 Not only does this reading of
the Act harmonize this section with the rest of the statute, but any other
reading would put section (a)(6) in direct conflict with other sections. In
addition, this reading is in line with congressional intent and the
background against which Dodd-Frank was passed.
239. Utah, 536 U.S. at 474.
240. See supra Part II.A.
241. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
242. Id. (emphasis added); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175
(2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and
the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)).
243. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
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1. The Language “in A Manner Established” in Dodd-Frank Should Be
Read the Same Way as it Was in Litmon
The court in Litmon adopts this reading of the words “in a manner
established” to interpret the statute at issue in that case.244 Therefore, in
Litmon, the statute authorized the DOJ to “establish” the “manner” that
an individual verifies their address, and requiring in person registration at
a police station was in line with that mandate.245 In the same way,
according to the Dodd-Frank statute, the SEC is to “establish” the
“manner” by which an employee provides information to the Commission
and becomes a whistleblower.246 For purposes of the anti-retaliation
section, allowing employees to report internally would be in line with that
mandate.247
This reading does not contradict the Second Circuit’s interpretation
of the language. In Stryker, the Second Circuit found that the language
“in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission” is
Congressional authorization for the SEC to clarify the vague definition of
“original information.”248 The court found that the SEC could dictate the
“form and manner” in which the information is provided.249 From its
context, “form and manner” is likely limited to certain administrative
functions.250 The alternative reading proposed here would expand the
Second Circuit’s reading: the statute allows the SEC to establish more
than just the technical criteria of the way a whistleblower provides
information, but the substantive criteria as well. If the SEC provides by
rule or regulation that, for the purposes of the anti-retaliation provisions,
whistleblowers may report to their employers, then that is a proper
“manner” for the whistleblower to do so.251 Congress has authorized the
SEC to create different categories of whistleblowers.
244. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
245. Litmon v. Brown, No. C-10-3894 EMC, 2011WL 873162, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
14, 2011).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
247. Id. The distinction between the California statute and Dodd-Frank is that the
California statute does not contain the equivalent language of “to the Commission” found
in Dodd-Frank. The California statute just says individuals must verify their address in a
manner established by the DOJ, not verify their address “to the DOJ” in a manner
established by the DOJ.
248. Stryker v. SEC, 780 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2015).
249. Id. at 166.
250. See supra Part II.B.1.
251. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
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2. Reading Section (a)(6) as a Limit on the Definition of Whistleblower
Would Put Section (a)(6) in Conflict With Other Provisions of the
Statute, While Reading Section (a)(6) as a Broad Grant of Authority to
the SEC Would Not
This reading harmonizes section (a)(6) with the rest of the statute,
while the circuit courts’ reading creates tension with parts of section
(c)(2), which provides for the denial of award in certain situations.252 Not
only does the text in section (c)(2) clearly envision more than one
category of whistleblower—despite the circuit courts’ claim that section
(a)(6) only allows for one category—but the courts’ reading of section
(a)(6) would also render section (c)(2) superfluous, which would violate
a canon of statutory interpretation.253
Section (c)(2), which provides for the denial of an award in
situations, clearly envisions the importance of internal reporting.254
Subsection (C) states that no award shall be made “to any whistleblower
who gains the information through the performance of an audit of
financial statements required under the securities laws and for whom such
submission would be contrary to the requirements of [15 U.S.C. 78j-
1].”255 Section 78j-1(b) provides the “[r]equired response to audit
discoveries” by auditors of publicly traded companies who uncover
illegal or potentially illegal activity.256 The statute requires that auditors
“inform the appropriate level of management of the issuer and assure that
the audit committee of the issuer . . . is adequately informed with respect
to the illegal acts that have been detected.”257 If nothing is done to remedy
the situation the auditor is then required to make a report directly to the
Board.258 The issuer is then required to inform the SEC of the situation
252. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6), (c)(2).
253. Id.; TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it
can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
254. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2) (2012).
255. Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C).
256. Id. § 78j-1(b).
257. Id. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B).
258. Id. § 78j-1(b)(2).
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and provide the auditor with a copy of its disclosure to the Commission.259
The auditor may then go to the Commission and file a report.260
Therefore, the auditor-whistleblower must inform the issuer at least
twice and then give the issuer an additional day to contact the
Commission before the auditor itself may provide information to the
Commission.261 If the auditor deviates from this route and alerts the
Commission ahead of time, it will be denied a whistleblower award
pursuant to subsection (c)(2)(C) of Dodd-Frank.262 Despite denying them
a reward, auditors are still whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank.263 This
reading suggests that there are at least two types of whistleblowers: those
who qualify for an award and those who do not. If there is a category of
whistleblowers who do not receive an award, they should also be a
recipient of the Act’s protection. Therefore, Subsection (C) suggests there
is a category of whistleblowers who are entitled to an award and the Act’s
protections, and a category of whistleblowers who are entitled to the Act’s
protections, but not an award.264 Reading section (a)(6) to grant authority
to the SEC does not conflict with subsection (c)(2)(C).265 Rather,
Congress prefers to reward auditors who report internally, while still
authorizing the SEC to protect auditors from retaliation when the
information is reported to the Commission.266
Subsection (c)(2)(D) also shows that the Act recognizes more than
one type of whistleblower.267 According to the circuit courts, to be a
whistleblower under section (a)(6), a person must report directly to the
Commission, in the form and manner required by Commission.268
However, subsection (D) states that no award shall be made to “any
whistleblower who fails to submit information to the Commission in such
form as the Commission may, by rule, require.”269 It follows that there are
259. Id. § 78j-1(b)(3).
260. Id. § 78j-1(b)(4).
261. Id. § 78j-1(b).
262. Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6), (c)(2)(C).
266. In this situation the auditor still complies with the mandate to report “to the
Commission,” but this scenario exemplifies that the Act recognizes more than one
category of whistleblower.
267. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D) (2012).
268. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6); see supra Part II.A.1.
269. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D) (2012).
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multiple categories of whistleblowers: (1) those who submit information
in the form required and thereby qualifies for an award and the Act’s
protections; and (2) those who do not submit information in the form
required to qualify for an award, but are nonetheless whistleblowers
entitled to the Act’s protections. Subsection (D) would also still serve a
purpose under a framework where section (a)(6) grants broad authority to
the SEC.270 The Act would protect those whistleblowers who took the leap
of reaching out and providing information to the SEC in a manner they
prescribed,271 but subsection (D) ensures that only those who provide
useful information to the SEC are awarded.272 According to this reading,
section (a)(6) and subsection (D) of the statute are not in conflict, but
instead complement each other to further serve Congress’s intent to
protect all whistleblowers report, but only award those who provide useful
information.273
a. The Current Reading of Section (a)(6) Conflicts with Subsections (C)
and (D)
The Supreme Court has held that statutory conflict should be avoided
when possible.274 According to the Fifth Circuit, with which the Second
and Ninth Circuits agreed,275 section (a)(6) describes only one category of
whistleblower, those who report to the SEC, and presumably that category
of whistleblower is entitled to both protections and awards. However,
subsections (c)(2)(C) and (D) make reference to two categories of
whistleblowers: (1) whistleblowers who are entitled to both rewards and
protections; and (2) whistleblowers not entitled to an award, yet still
entitled to protection.276 While it is not explicitly said, if a whistleblower
is not entitled to an award, they must be entitled to the Act’s protections.
It would be absurd for a person to be considered a whistleblower under
270. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6), (c)(2)(D).
271. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
272. Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D).
273. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6), (c)(2)(D).
274. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“A
court must therefore interpret the statute as ‘a symmetrical and coherent regulatory
scheme,’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)), “and fit, if
possible, all parts into an harmonious whole” (quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359
U.S. 385, 389 (1959))).
275. See supra Part II.A.
276. See supra Part III.A.2.
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the Act if they were entitled to neither the incentives nor the protections
offered by the Act.277 Congress authorized the SEC to determine who
qualifies as a whistleblower, including, whether there is more than one
type of whistleblower.
In addition, the circuit courts’ reading of section (a)(6) renders
subsection (D) superfluous.278 According to the circuits, the only way to
become a whistleblower is to meet the criteria of section (a)(6).279 Part of
that criteria is providing the information “in a manner established . . . by
the Commission.”280 If you do not meet any of the criteria of section
(a)(6), then you are not a whistleblower.281 If an individual fails to provide
the information “in a manner established” by the Commission, they would
have failed part of the criteria of section (a)(6), and would not be a
whistleblower under the Act.282 Therefore the individual would not be
entitled to any of the Act’s awards.283 It would be redundant for subsection
(D) to provide that no award shall be made to “any whistleblower who
fails to submit information to the Commission in such form as the
Commission may, by rule, require.”284 A reading of section (a)(6) that
grants broad authority to the SEC to determine more than just the
technical “form,” but the substantive “manner” in which one provides
information to the SEC eliminates that conflict.285 As stated above, under
this new framework for section (a)(6), subsection (D) still plays an
important role: someone can still be a whistleblower and receive the Act’s
protections, but fail to submit the information in a manner required, which
renders them ineligible to receive an award.286
277. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (“If a
literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to
avoid the absurdity.”).
278. The Supreme Court has cautioned against interpretations that render portions of
a statute superfluous. See, e.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162,
185 (2011).
279. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. § 78u-6(b).
284. Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D).
285. Id.
286. Id.
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b. The Proposed Reading of Section (a)(6) Does Not Contradict with
Subsection (H)(1)(A)
A reading of section (a)(6) that grants authority to the SEC to
“establish” the “manner” by which one may submit information to the
Commission and become a whistleblower would resolve any conflict with
subsection (iii).287 The Act states:
No employer may . . . discriminate against, a whistleblower in the
terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done
by the whistleblower . . . in making disclosures that are required or
protected under [SOX], this chapter, including [15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)], [18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)], and any other law, rule, or
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.288
Section (a)(6) authorizes the SEC to determine how an individual
submits information to it and becomes a whistleblower under the Act.289
This Note proposes that the SEC’s determination that an individual is a
“whistleblower” under section (a)(6) should be definitive when
determining whether that individual is protected by the other provisions
in the Act, including subsection (iii). Therefore, an individual who
provides information “required or protected under [SOX]”290 “in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission”291 is protected by
the anti-retaliation provisions in subsection (iii). This interpretation—in
contrast to the holdings of the Fifth, Second, and Ninth Circuits—gives
effect to each portion of the statute and provides adequate protection to
all whistleblowers.
Critics may argue, such as the Fifth Circuit did in Asadi, that reading
subsection (iii) to incorporate SOX would render the whistleblower
protections under SOX obsolete.292 Dodd-Frank affords twice as much
back pay to the whistleblower, allows the whistleblower to file a claim
directly in federal court, and lets the whistleblower file a claim up to ten
years after the violation.293 In contrast, SOX affords only regular back
pay, requires claims to be filed with the DoL, permits a claim to be filed
287. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6), (h)(1)(A)(iii).
288. Id. § 78u-6 (h)(1)(A)(iii).
289. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
290. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
291. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
292. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 628–29 (5th Cir. 2013).
293. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(i)–(iii).
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in federal district court only if the DoL decides not to pursue the claim,
and the claim needs to be made within 180 days.294 Therefore, critics may
reason that it is unlikely an individual would elect to file a SOX claim
over a Dodd-Frank claim. However, as the Ninth Circuit found, if an
individual files a SOX claim and the DoL decides to pursue it, the case
will be handled by the DoL; the whistleblower will not have the expend
the time and costs to pursue litigation.295 Further, if the DoL decides to
pursue an action, the whistleblower may feel more confident about the
merits of their claim. Moreover, SOX allows a whistleblower to recover
for special damages related to the retaliation including emotional
distress.296 Therefore, if the whistleblower has experienced harm other
than financial harm, pursuing a Dodd-Frank claim is not the best option.
These distinctions make filing a claim under SOX an attractive choice for
a whistleblower.
The reading of section (a)(6) proposed by this Note aligns generally
with the purpose of Dodd-Frank.297 Congress tried to protect
whistleblowers when it enacted SOX, however, it proved to be
ineffective.298 Despite its shortcomings, SOX’s whistleblower provisions
still had the potential to have some teeth. By incorporating SOX’s
whistleblower provisions into Dodd-Frank through subsection (iii),
Congress gave SOX those teeth. Furthermore, Congress ensured that
regardless of the SEC’s decision on who else was a whistleblower and the
awards and protections they get, SOX whistleblowers would at least
benefit from protection in some aspect no matter what.299 The SEC would
still get to use all its agency expertise to decide the other ways that
providing information to the Commission should be protected, but
Congress wanted to at least protect the auditors and lawyers subject to
SOX. Further, the Supreme Court has supported this interpretation of “in
a manner established.”300
294. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A)–(C) (2012).
295. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2017).
296. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1).
297. “An Act To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to fail”, to protect
the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (emphasis added).
298. See supra Part I.A.
299. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
300. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
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B. THE POLICYCONSIDERATIONSCONGRESSWASADDRESSING AT THE
TIME IT PASSEDDODD-FRANKALSO SUGGEST ABROADREADING OF
SECTION (A)(6)
Reading section (a)(6) as a broad grant of authority to the SEC, rather
than a limit on the definition of a whistleblower, aligns with the general
purpose of Dodd-Frank.301 Dodd-Frank was enacted in the background of
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, when trust in the
financial industry was at an all-time low. Financial institutions had been
allowed to run amuck by hiding behind complex investment tools like
collateralized debt obligations in order to conceal their growing deficits
from having invested in increasingly risky subprime mortgages. As Paul
Krugman Stated:
[w]hat do you get when you cross a Mafia don with a bond salesman?
A dealer in collateralized debt obligations (C.D.O.’s)—someone who
makes you an offer you don’t understand.
Seriously, it’s starting to look as if C.D.O.’s were to this decade’s
housing bubble what Enron-style accounting was to the stock bubble
of the 1990s. Both made investors think they were getting a much
better deal than they really were. And the new scandal raises two
obvious questions: Why were the bond-rating agencies taken in
(again), and where were the regulators?302
Congress intended to give the SEC the broad power to use its
expertise to determine how an individual becomes a whistleblower rather
than to limit the agency to work with a narrow, predetermined definition.
As the Supreme Court noted in Lawson, “[i]f anything relevant . . . can be
gleaned from Dodd–Frank, it is that Congress apparently does not share
[the business industries’] concerns about extending protection
comprehensively to corporate whistleblowers.”303 This should be no
different for section (a)(6) and its current interpretation comprehensively
excludes a significant number of potential whistleblowers.
301. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012).
302. Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help Avoid
Future Financial Debacles?, 2 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 217, 220 (2009) (quoting Paul
Krugman, Just Say AAA, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2007, at A19).
303. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1175 (2014).
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C. THE SEC’SRULE 21F DECLARING INTERNAL REPORTSARE
WHISTLEBLOWERS FOR PURPOSES OFDODD-FRANK’SANTI-RETALIATION
SECTION SHOULDBE ENTITLED TODEFERENCEUNDERCHEVRON
Pursuant to its statutory authority, as proposed by this Note, the SEC
has promulgated Rule 21F-2 which designates an employee who reports
internally as a whistleblower for purposes of section (h).304 “For purposes
of the anti-retaliation protections . . . you are a whistleblower if . . . you
provide . . . information in a manner described in [15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)].”305 Congress has passed an Act expressly granting the SEC
authority to “establish” the “manner” in which an employee may provide
information to the Commission. The SEC has determined that for the
purposes of section (h), reporting internally is one way in which an
individual may provide information to the Commission. This agency
interpretation should be given deference under Chevron.306 This reading
of section (a)(6) is a plausible reading. If a text is susceptible to more than
one equally plausible reading, the ambiguity warrants Chevron
deference.307
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in the wake of the Financial
Crisis of 2008 it was attempting to reign in the financial industry.
Congress realized the integral position that whistleblowers have in
financial regulation and therefore sought to incentivize and protect them
with the whistleblower provisions of the Act. The various circuit court
decisions interpreting the Act have read the Act through a narrow lens and
unnecessarily limited the definition of a whistleblower to an individual
who reports directly to the Commission. Congress likely intended for a
much broader reading of the Act. It is clear that Congress meant to grant
304. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (2012).
305. Id.
306. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
307. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
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broad authority to the SEC to “establish” the “manner” in which an
individual becomes a whistleblower.
